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Optimal Provision-After-Wait in Healthcare∗
Mark Braverman† Jing Chen‡ Sampath Kannan§
Abstract
We investigate computational and mechanism design aspects of optimal scarce resource al-
location, where the primary rationing mechanism is through waiting times. Specifically we
consider the problem of allocating medical treatments to a population of patients. Each patient
has demand for exactly one unit of treatment, and can choose to be treated in one of k hospitals,
H1, . . . , Hk. Different hospitals have different costs, which are fully paid by a third party —the
“payer”— and do not accrue to the patients. The payer has a fixed budget B and can only
cover a limited number of treatments in the more expensive hospitals. Access to over-demanded
hospitals is rationed through waiting times: each hospital Hi will have waiting time wi. In equi-
librium, each patient will choose his most preferred hospital given his intrinsic preferences and
the waiting times. The payer thus computes the waiting times and the number of treatments
authorized for each hospital, so that in equilibrium the budget constraint is satisfied and the
social welfare is maximized.
We show that even if the patients’ preferences are known to the payer, the task of optimizing
social welfare in equilibrium subject to the budget constraint is NP-hard. We also show that,
with constant number of hospitals, if the budget constraint can be relaxed from B to (1+ǫ)B for
an arbitrarily small constant ǫ, then the original optimum under budget B can be approximated
very efficiently.
Next, we study the endogenous emergence of waiting time from the dynamics between hospi-
tals and patients, and show that there is no need for the payer to explicitly enforce the optimal
equilibrium waiting times. When the patients arrive uniformly along time and when they have
generic types, all that the payer needs to do is to enforce the total amount of money he would
like to pay to each hospital. The waiting times will simply change according to the demand,
and the dynamics will always converge to the desired waiting times in finite time.
We then go beyond equilibrium solutions and investigate the optimization problem over a
much larger class of mechanisms containing the equilibrium ones as special cases. In the setting
with two hospitals, we show that under a natural assumption on the patients’ preference profiles,
optimal welfare is in fact attained by the randomized assignment mechanism, which allocates
patients to hospitals at random subject to the budget constraint, but avoids waiting times.
Finally, we discuss potential policy implications of our results, as well as follow-up directions
and open problems.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we study computational and mechanism design issues in the context of optimal
healthcare provision. Specifically, we consider the setting where waiting times, and not payments,
are used to allocate scarce care resources among patients. Waiting times in healthcare provision is
an important topic of public debate worldwide. For example, it has a central role in the ongoing
debate surrounding the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”) in the United
States. In a large number of countries with public health coverage financing, including Australia,
Canada, Spain, and the United Kingdom, procedures such as elective surgery are rationed by
waiting [26, 11]. While in the public perception waiting times are often associated with poor
resource management, in the economics literature it is well-understood that queues of consumers
will form whenever a good is priced below the good’s perceived value, as long as supply is scarce
[4, 21, 16] – independently of the ultimate distribution mechanism. In particular, waiting times
in this context are dictated by economic incentive constraints and not by stochastic fluctuations
as in classical queuing theory. Therefore, whenever “correct” monetary pricing is impossible or
undesirable, waiting times should be incorporated explicitly into the allocation models.
We focus on providing a single non-urgent healthcare service (such as a particular surgery)
to a population of patients, and define the Provision-after-Wait problem for this scenario.
In our model, a population of patients arrives in each time unit (say, 1 month), seeking for the
desired service at some hospital. There are k hospitals providing the service under different costs.
The patients have different preferences about the hospitals, and the composition of the patient
population in each time unit is the same. Each patient needs to be served exactly once. The
service is fully financed by a third party —a “payer”, e.g., the government or an insurer. Therefore
the patients’ choices of hospitals are not affected by the (monetary) costs. But the payer, taken
to be the government in the rest of this paper for concreteness, has a fixed budget B that he is
willing to spend on providing the service to the entire patient population in each time unit, and it
is unaffordable to let every patient go to his favorite hospital (otherwise the provision problem is
already solved at the very beginning). Without loss of generality, we assume that the government
has enough budget to treat all patients in the cheapest hospital. This can always be achieved by
adding a dummy hospital which has cost 0 and is the least preferred by all patients, representing
the option of not getting any service.
The government rations the patients’ demand subject to his budget by setting for each hospital
Hi a waiting time wi, measured using the same time unit. Every patient going to Hi has to wait for
wi before he can be served. There is no co-pays, and thus the waiting time is the only cost directly
incurred by the patients.1 We assume that waiting times are known to the patients before they
make decisions.2 Each patient Pj has value vij for hospital Hi, representing his utility for being
treated in Hi right away. Similar to [10], we assume that the patients have quasi-linear utilities
with respect to waiting time, that is, patient Pj ’s utility for being treated at Hi with waiting time
wi is uij , vij − wi. The primary reason for this choice is that it is the most natural way to
ensure that patients are treated equally by welfare-optimizing mechanisms. Since, as mechanism
designers, we do not have full access to the uij’s of individual patients but can observe waiting
times, our welfare-loss due to waiting will just be the sum of all the waiting times in the system3.
1Adding co-pays to the model would be interesting follow-up work, but the space of possible models is far vaster
with co-pays. Issues in introducing co-pays include dealing with different people having different time/money trade-
offs, and defining the patients’ utility properly (with the usual ethical question: do people with higher utility for
money have lower utility for health, a.k.a. “should poor people count for less”?). In this paper we avoid these
problems, since time is fair to everybody and our patients utility is measured in waiting-time equivalents.
2For example, the patients can observe the length of the lines before deciding which one to join, or they can be
informed explicitly when trying to make an appointment.
3We can relax this assumption to allow utility functions of the form uij = vij − U(wi), where U(w) is a function
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The patients are unrestricted in their choices of hospitals. Thus, at equilibrium, a patient is
assigned to a hospital that maximizes his utility given the waiting times. The social welfare of an
equilibrium is defined to be the total utility of the patients in each time unit. The government’s
goal when solving the Provision-after-Wait problem is to find the optimal equilibrium waiting
times and assignments of patients to hospitals that maximize social welfare, subject to the budget
constraint.
Our model is formally defined in Section 2. Below we would like to emphasize three main
features of it.
Two non-interchangeable “currencies”. Firstly, as money is still involved, the setting leads
to two non-interchangeable “currencies” of money and waiting time. This complicates the design
problem, both conceptually and computationally. As we shall see from the first part of our main
results, even if money and waiting time are kept separate and only the latter affects the demand,
the fact that they cannot be “traded” for each other (thus reducing the setting to one currency)
makes the problem much more difficult.
Indirect control of waiting times. Secondly, although waiting time is modeled as a parameter
whose optimal value is decided by the government, there is no need for the government to enforce
it explicitly. Instead, as we shall show in the second part of our main results, the government can
simply decide the amount of money it is willing to pay to each hospital in each time unit, and the
desired waiting times at different hospitals will emerge endogenously among the hospitals and the
patients. Indeed, the role of waiting time in our model is similar to that of price in markets. In a
market, it is the price that ultimately drives consumers to different purchases, but the producers
do not get to dictate it. They can only control the price indirectly by adjusting their supply levels,
and the “correct” price will emerge endogenously from the market. This analogy makes it more
reasonable to adopt our model in reality: it is more natural for the government to control the
amount of money it pays and tell a hospital “I’ll only pay you $5,000 each month for this service”,
than for it to control waiting times and tell a hospital “you have to make each patient using this
service wait for 3 months”.
Welfare-burning effect of waiting times. Finally, unlike monetary transfers, nobody benefits
from one’s waiting time, and thus waiting times represent a net loss in welfare. That is why in our
model the social welfare is defined as the total utility of the patients —that is, total value minus
total waiting time—, differently from auctions where social welfare is the total value of the buyers.
The welfare-burning phenomenon is common in the study of resource allocation with waiting times,
and is similar to the money-burning mechanisms [14], subject to the important caveat that time
burnt is not interchangeable with money.
Given the general welfare-burning effect of waiting times, it is very natural to ask whether they
can be avoided or reduced via a different allocation mechanism altogether. If monetary payments
are not allowed, and patients are free to choose their hospitals, then the (deterministic) equilibrium
solution of the Provision-after-Wait problem is the only one possible. What if the government
has sufficient control over the patients that it can tell them where to receive their treatment, or
otherwise restrict their options4? The simplest such mechanism would be a randomized assignment
of patients to available slots, with the probabilities decided by the budget constraint. In such
assignment, we benefit from zero waiting time. On the downside, we incur an efficiency loss:
patients may not end up in the hospitals they prefer. How does this randomized assignment
(common to all patients) that maps waiting time w to utility loss caused by waiting w time units.
4Possible “soft” mechanisms for doing this are discussed below.
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mechanism compare to the mechanism where patients are given a free choice and waiting times
are used as a rationing tool? The answer to this question depends on the preference profiles of
the patients. Informally speaking, if patients have strong and diverse preferences on where to be
treated, then the free-choice equilibrium mechanism is better, since efficiency gains due to better
allocation offset the inefficiency caused by waiting. At the other extreme, if all patients have similar
preferences, then no efficiencies are to be gained from patients’ choice, and randomized assignment
mechanisms are superior. We further investigate this question in the case of two hospitals, in the
third part of our main results.
1.1 Main results
Finding optimal equilibrium waiting times and assignments
We first study the computational issues in our model, assuming that the government is fully in-
formed about the hospitals’ costs and the patients’ valuations. The following theorem shows that
the Provision-after-Wait problem is hard to solve in general.
Theorem 1. Finding optimal equilibrium waiting times and assignments is NP-hard.
The hardness result motivates one to ask whether one can efficiently approximate the welfare
of the optimal solution. Interestingly, we show that if we relax the budget constraint to (1 + ǫ)B
with an arbitrarily small constant ǫ, we can achieve at least as much welfare as the best B-budget
equilibrium solution, using an algorithm whose running time depends on (logm)k, where m is the
number of patients in one time unit and k is, as already mentioned, the number of hospitals.
Theorem 2. (rephrased) There is an algorithm that runs in time O
(
(log1+ǫm)
k ·m4
)
and outputs
an equilibrium solution such that, the total cost is at most (1+ ǫ)B and the social welfare is at least
as high as that of the optimal equilibrium solution with budget B.
These results are formally presented in Sections 3 and 4. It remains an interesting open problem
whether there is a welfare approximation algorithm that does not exceed the budget. Also, it is
unknown whether there is an approximation algorithm that is polynomial in k.
Letting waiting times emerge endogenously
Next we show how the desired waiting times and the corresponding optimal social welfare can
emerge endogenously as the patients arrive and choose their favorite hospitals in dynamics. Say the
government has decided how to spend its budget for the desired service, by using our approximation
algorithm above or by using other methods. The way of spending the budget can be enforced by
setting the quota for each hospital, namely, how many patients the government is willing to pay in
one time unit (of course, the total quota must be at least the number of patients).
It is natural to assume that the hospitals want to keep waiting times as low as possible, and
at time 0 all hospitals have waiting time 0. When the patients arrive along time, they choose
which hospital to go according to their own valuations and the current waiting times. If a hospital
gets over-demanded, namely, the number of patients going there exceeds the quota paid by the
government, then a line has to form and this hospital’s waiting time increases accordingly. If the
waiting time becomes too high due to previous demand, patients arriving later may choose not to go
there and the hospital may become under-demanded, causing its waiting time to decrease. As there
may be many waiting time vectors of the hospitals that correspond to equilibrium assignment given
the quotas, it is not immediately clear which one the dynamics will converge to (if it converges),
and how much social welfare the government can generate from the dynamics.
Assuming the patients’ valuations are in a generic position as properly defined in Section 5, our
following theorem characterizes the structure of the optimal equilibrium given any quotas of the
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hospitals.
Theorem 3. (rephrased) For any quotas of the hospitals, there is a unique optimal equilibrium
maximizing social welfare. It has the minimum waiting time vector among all equilibria, and any
hospital whose quota is not fully used has waiting time 0.
Accordingly, it is reasonable to hope that the optimal equilibrium is the one implemented by
the dynamics. Our following theorem shows this is indeed the case.
Theorems 4 and 5. (rephrased) At any point of time, the waiting time of any hospital will never
exceed its waiting time in the optimal equilibrium, and thus the social welfare generated in any time
unit will be at least the optimal social welfare given the quotas. The dynamics will always converge
to the optimal equilibrium, in time proportional to the number of hospitals, the maximum social
welfare of the patients, and the maximum quota of the hospitals.
These results are formally presented in Section 5.
When is the randomized assignment optimal?
Finally, we turn our attention to the enlarged setting where we are not limited to mechanisms that
produce equilibrium solutions. The two “extreme” mechanisms are the equilibrium mechanism
discussed above that gives the patients free choices, and the randomized assignment mechanism
that assigns patients at random to available slots and does not give them any choice. In addition,
there is an infinite number of various lotteries in-between these extremes. In a lottery, the patients
are presented with a set of distributions over hospitals, with an expected waiting time associated
with each distribution. Instead of free choices among all possible (distributions of) hospitals, the
patients can only choose from the available ones in the lottery, and they make choices to maximize
their expected utilities.
Intuitively, if there are no extreme variations among the patients’ preferences, the randomized
assignment should outperform other mechanisms, since it avoids the deadweight loss of waiting
times. We give further evidence suggesting that randomized assignment may be superior in terms
of social welfare, by analyzing the case when there are two hospitals.
Let the hospitals be H0 and H1 with costs c0 and c1 respectively, such that c0 < c1. We assume
without loss of generality that patients going to hospital H0 faces no waiting time
5. Thus patients
who prefer H0 over H1 will always choose H0. We can therefore exclude them from consideration,
and focus on patients who prefer H1 over H0.
We assume a continuous population of such patients, indexed by the [0, 1] interval. Each patient
x is associated with a value v(x), representing how much time x is willing to wait to be treated
in H1 instead of H0. That is, v(x) is the difference between x’s utility for being treated at H1
immediately and his utility for being treated at H0 immediately. We rename the patients so that
v(x) is a non-decreasing function on [0, 1]. Thus, for example, v(0.5) represents the median time
that patients preferring H1 are willing to wait to be treated there. We prove the following theorem
in Section 6.
Theorem 6. (rephrased) If v(x) is concave, then no lottery can generate more social welfare than
the randomized assignment.
Here a lottery is a set of options, each consisting of a probability of being treated in H1 and
the corresponding waiting time there. This shows that for a broad class of preferences, the ran-
domized assignment is welfare-maximizing even when waiting times are an option available to the
government. As a special case, this shows that randomized assignment has better welfare than the
5Indeed, positive waiting time at H0 will give patients incentives to go to the more expensive hospital H1, and
thus increase the total cost while burning more social welfare.
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optimal equilibrium solution. It would be interesting to find an analogous sufficient condition for
three or more hospitals.
1.2 Discussion and open problems
In this paper we consider two separate issues. The first one is how to optimally allocate treatments
in equilibrium, when the government faces budget constraints and waiting times are used to ration
patients’ behavior. The second one is whether it may be beneficial to do away with the (ex-post)
equilibrium requirements by limiting available options of the patients.
While finding the optimal equilibrium solution in the Provision-after-Wait problem is NP-
hard, our approximation result suggests that this problem might not be as difficult in practice. In
many cases the number of treatment facilities involved is fairly small, making running time expo-
nential in k feasible. Moreover, in some cases the “hospitals” are actually treatment alternatives
that vary in costs (e.g. physiotherapy is cheaper than knee replacement), in which case k may be
as low as 2. For the general case where k can be big, it would be interesting to explore restrictions
on the patients’ valuations that would make the exact optimization efficient, such as when the
valuations are highly correlated so that the valuation matrix (vij) has low rank. There are many
questions one can ask about the general complexity of the Provision-after-Wait problem, for
example, whether it is strongly NP-hard, whether it has an FPTAS, whether it is fixed-parameter
tractable in the number of hospitals, etc.
As we shall show, equilibrium assignment with waiting times has a strong connection to unit-
demand auctions [7, 1], and such a connection leads to our approximation result. One natural
question is whether this connection can be used in dynamic setting to show that the system will
remain in the patient-optimal equilibrium as the population’s preferences slowly shift over time.
A related question is whether it is possible to approximate optimal welfare in equilibrium if the
government only knows the approximate distribution of patient types in the population. Another
related question is whether one can design mechanisms for our setting such that the patients have
incentives to truthfully reveal their valuations, so that the government does not need to know these
valuations to begin with. A similar question is whether the government can elicit the hospitals’
true costs via some mechanisms —given the existence of rent in healthcare, finding true costs and
paying hospitals accordingly would be helpful in reducing the government’s expenses.
The study of waiting times as a rationing mechanism is closely related to the study of ordeal
mechanisms [2], where other tools (e.g. excessive bureaucracy) are used in place of waiting times
to reduce demand to the supply level6. These may be used in settings where queues are not an
option such as school choice. Developing computational mechanism design tools for these settings
is a very interesting direction of study.
Our third result looks beyond equilibrium solutions. We give evidence that equilibrium solutions
are in fact dominated in many cases. One immediate implication is that giving the government
power to restrict choice may in fact improve overall welfare. While this is perhaps not surprising,
choice restriction may be very difficult or politically infeasible to implement in practice, due to the
fact that patients have an inherent preference for choice [23].
There are important indirect ways, however, in which the government may influence choice. One
of them is through release (or non-release) of quality of care information about providers. The topic
of quality of care information is important both in theory and in practice. In the United States,
for example, Medicare has started to publicly release hospital performance information as part of
its pay-for-performance push [17]. The effect performance reporting has on provider incentives has
6Note that in medicine not all ordeals are necessarily dead-weight loss. For example, the famous (and highly-
demanded) Shouldice hernia clinic in Ontario, Canada requires its patients to lose weight before being admitted for
a surgery [15]. Most clinics do not place such a requirement.
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been the subject of much study and discussion [24, 20, 13]. It has even been suggested that it would
be possible to manipulate reported quality metrics in a way that would force the provider to exert
first-best quality and cost effort [22]. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no work on the
effect of quality reporting on patient incentives.7
Inasmuch as quality information influences patients’ choices, it may actually cause harm in the
context of allocation using waiting times. Consider a scenario where there are two hospitals, a good
one Hg and a bad one Hb. All patients prefer the good hospital over the bad by the same amount,
but they do not know which is which. As a result, both hospitals will receive half the patients,
and waiting time will be zero. If the government reveals that Hg is the good hospital through its
quality-of-care disclosure, then all patients will prefer Hg over Hb by the same amount ∆. Unless
Hg has enough slots for everybody, the waiting time there will have to be ∆, which completely
burns social welfare and makes all patients worse-off than when they were ignorant. In effect, before
the quality disclosure, uninformed patients implemented the randomized assignment – through free
choice. Once the quality information was disclosed, the game moved to the equilibrium solution.
Our results and the discussion above suggest that in some cases a population of more informed
patients will experience higher waiting times and lower overall utility than uninformed patients.
This suggests an unfortunate potential side effect of information disclosure in cases where allocation
is done by waiting times. Such a side effect deserves further study since, at the moment, quality
information release is regarded as an absolute good. Understanding the optimal structure of infor-
mation released to the patients in terms of overall welfare (as well as provider-side incentives) is an
important and interesting direction of study.
1.3 Additional related work
The role of waiting time can be studied either from the supply side, namely, how waiting times
interact with the hospitals’ incentives, or from the demand side, namely, how they interact with
the patients’ incentives. In [26] the authors give a thorough analysis of existing policies on reducing
waiting times by affecting the incentives of either side. Our model focuses on the demand side, and
below we discuss some other works that also focus on this side.
The authors of [11] study quality and waiting times with the existence of ex post moral hazard.
They assume that the patients are ex ante identical, and that the treatment has objective quality
levels with which both the valuations and the costs are monotonically increasing. But notice that if
the patients are identical, rationing by waiting times is bounded to burn a lot of social welfare since
at equilibrium every patient has to be treated in the same way —as elaborated in our results. In
our model the patients’ valuations can be arbitrarily associated with different hospitals, reflecting
subjective views they may have, and the hospitals’ costs can also be arbitrary and do not necessarily
reflect their real quality.
In [10, 12] the authors study the effect of waiting time prioritization on social welfare. They
consider a single waiting list (or in our language, a single hospital), and the patients are prioritized
and may face different waiting times in the same list. In our model different hospitals may have
different waiting times, but we do not discriminate the patients, and at the same hospital everybody
faces the same waiting time. In [6] the authors give experimental evidence on the effect of expanding
patient choice of providers on waiting times. In their theoretical model, there are two hospitals
and the patients can freely go to the one with shorter waiting time. Thus the patients do not have
subjective preferences over hospitals, and waiting time is the only parameter affecting their choices.
Moreover, the authors of [9] study the relationship between waiting times and coinsurance, with a
single hospital and a single representative consumer.
7In [5] the authors show that in special market structures the consumers may benefit from their uncertainty about
the product valuation. But the model is very different.
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In [19] the author studies resource allocation where the consumers wait for the stochastic arrival
of the items. Differently from our model and the models discussed above, in this work waiting time
does not burn social welfare, as the total waiting time of the consumers is always the time for
enough items to arrive. There are two different types of items to be allocated, and also two types of
consumers, respectively preferring one type of items. A consumer can decide whether he wants to
take the arriving item or to continue waiting for his preferred type. The social welfare of the system
is measured by the probability that a consumer is matched to his preferred type. Although this is a
very different model from ours, it is worth mentioning that the author provides a truthful queuing
policy which is optimal. As we have discussed in Section 1.2, it would be interesting to design a
truthful mechanism in our model from which the government can elicit the patients’ valuations.
Finally, in none of the works mentioned above is the insurance/resource provider’s budget
constraint considered as a parameter affecting waiting times and social welfare.
2 The Provision-After-Wait Problem
Now let us be formal about our model. The Provision-after-Wait problem studies how to
provide a single healthcare service to a population of patients, and is specified by the following
parameters.
• The set of hospitals is {H1, . . . ,Hk}.
• For each i ∈ [k], the cost of Hi serving one patient is ci ∈ Z
+, where Z+ is the set of
non-negative integers.
• The set of patients is {P1, . . . , Pm}.
• For each i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [m], the value of patient Pj for hospital Hi is vij ∈ Z
+.
• An assignment of the patients to the hospitals is a triple (w, h, λ), where w = (w1, . . . , wk) ∈
(Z+)k is the waiting time vector of the hospitals, h : [m]→ [k] is the assignment function, and
λ = (λ1, . . . , λk) ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
k with
∑
i∈[k] λi = m is the quota vector, such that |h
−1(i)| = λi
for each i ∈ [k].
According to such an assignment, patient Pj will receive the service at hospital Hh(j) after
waiting time wh(j).
• A patient Pj’s utility under assignment (w, h, λ) is uj(w, h, λ) , vh(j)j −wh(j), that is, quasi-
linear in the waiting time.
The social welfare of this assignment is SW (w, h, λ) ,
∑
j∈[m] uj(w, h, λ).
• The government has budget B ∈ Z+, and an assignment (w, h, λ) is feasible if
∑
i∈[k] λi ·ci ≤ B.
For the problem to be interesting, we assume that mcmin ≤ B < mcmax, where cmin and cmax
are respectively the minimum and the maximum cost of the hospitals.
Remark 1. The hospitals’ costs, the patients’ valuations, and the waiting times are assumed to be
integers without loss of generality. As long as they have finite description, we can always choose
proper units so that all of them are integers.
Remark 2. The quota vector of an assignment can be inferred from the assignment function and
thus is redundant. We define it explicitly to ease the discussion of our main results.
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We would like to emphasize that, in the healthcare literature waiting time is recognized as a
tool to ration supply by driving down demand. As such, it does not depend on the congestion at
the hospitals, but rather on the patients’ “willingness to wait”. In our model, the waiting times are
decided by the government according to its budget and the patients’ values. Even if a hospital’s
real capacity (namely, the maximum number of patients it is able to handle, which is typically
assumed to be large enough8) is bigger than the number of patients going there, the patients may
still have to wait for certain amount of time, because letting them wait for any shorter will result
in more patients demanding that hospital than the government can afford. This is demonstrated
by the following example.
Assume there are two hospitals, H0 and H1, with costs $500 and $3,000 respectively.
9 There
are three patients, valuing H1 for 10, 7, 3 respectively, and all valuing H0 for 0. The government
has budget $6,000. Assume that H1 is capable of handling all three patients immediately. Yet,
if the government lets H1 be saturated and sends all three patients there, the total cost will be
$9,000, which is unaffordable. It is clear that the government can afford only one patient at H1.
Thus at equilibrium the waiting time at H1 must be 7, and only the patient who is willing to wait
for 10 will actually be served there. Notice that this patient has to wait even though there is no
congestion at all, because of the budget constraint.
Since in reality the government may not be able or willing to force a patient to go to a hospital
assigned to him, it must ensure that wherever it wants that patient to go is indeed the best hospital
for him, given the waiting times. Accordingly, we have the following definition.
Definition 1. Assignment (w, h, λ) is an equilibrium assignment if: (1) it is feasible, (2) for each
j ∈ [m] we have uj(w, h, λ) ≥ 0, and (3) for each j ∈ [m] and i ∈ [k] we have
uj(w, h, λ) ≥ vij − wi.
Assignment (w, h, λ) is an optimal equilibrium assignment if: (1) it is an equilibrium assign-
ment, and (2) for any other equilibrium assignment (λ′, w′, h′),
SW (w, h, λ) ≥ SW (w′, h′, λ′).
The social welfare of optimal equilibrium assignments is denoted by SWOEA.
As we are interested in the (existence and) computation of optimal equilibrium assignments, we
assume that the government has precise knowledge about the cost of each hospital. We may also
assume that the government knows each patient’s valuation for each hospital, but we do not need it.
In fact, it is enough for the government to know the “distribution” of the k-dimensional valuation
vectors of the patients, namely, the fraction of the patients having each particular valuation vector.
(How to obtain such information is an interesting mechanism design as well as learning problem.)
Once it computes w in the optimal solution, the assignment function h will be automatically
implemented by the patients going to their favorite hospitals10, and the government need not know
where each patient is going.
8It is easy to introduce the hospitals’ real capacities as additional parameters into our model, and require that a
hospital’s quota in an assignment does not exceed its real capacity. But doing so does not make the problem any
more interesting —the optimization problem is even harder, and all our results remain true. Thus we simply assume
that the real capacities are large enough.
9In reality, the cheap “hospital” may in fact be a cheap service such as a CT scan, while the expensive one may
in fact be an expensive service such as an MRI. A patient is willing to get either one of them, with different values.
10Each patient can easily compute which hospital maximizes his utility, given that he knows the hospitals’ waiting
times and his own valuations. If there are more than one favorite hospitals for a patient, we assume that he goes to
the cheapest one, so that the budget constraint is satisfied.
8
Notice that it is not enough for the government to know the distribution of the valuations for
each single hospital, since the correlations between patients’ valuations for different hospitals will
affect the optimal outcome. As an easy example, say there are two hospitals H1 and H2 with
costs B − 1 and 1 respectively (B >> 1), and two patients P1 and P2. The valuation vector
(v11, v21, v12, v22) is either (10, 0, 4, 6) or (10, 6, 4, 0). For each single hospital, the distribution of
valuations is the same in the two cases. However, in the former case the optimal waiting time
vector is (0, 0) while in the latter it’s (4, 0). Thus the optimal solution can’t be computed given
only the valuation distributions of individual hospitals.
3 The Computational Complexity of Optimal Equilibrium Assign-
ments
We begin with two easy observations about our model, as a warm-up.
The first observation is that, if the patients have unanimous preferences, namely, vij = vij′ for
each i ∈ [k] and each j, j′ ∈ [m], then no equilibrium assignment can improve the social welfare
of the following trivial one: order the hospitals according to the patients’ valuations decreasingly,
find the first hospital Hi such that mci ≤ B, and assign all patients to Hi with wi = 0 and
wi′ = maxi′′∈[k] vi′′1 for any i
′ 6= i. Indeed, for any equilibrium assignment (w, h, λ) we have
vh(j)j − wh(j) = vh(j′)j − wh(j′) for each j, j
′ ∈ [m]. Letting i∗ = argmini:h−1(i)6=∅ ci, λ
′ be such that
λ′i∗ = m and λ
′
i = 0 for all other i, h
′ be such that h′(j) = i∗ for all j, we have that (w, h′, λ′) is
another equilibrium assignment with the same social welfare as (w, h, λ). Thus it suffices to look
for an optimal equilibrium assignment that sends all patients to the same hospital. This is also
intuitive: if the patients are all the same, then at equilibrium the government must make them
equally happy, and it can do so by treating them in the same way.
Another observation is that, even if the government only cares about meeting the budget con-
straint in expectation, and is allowed to assign each patient to several hospitals probabilistically
(with the total probability summing up to 1), the optimal social welfare it can get in expectation
will just be the same as the optimal one obtained by deterministic assignments. This is so because,
at equilibrium, all the hospitals to which a patient Pj is assigned with positive probability must
yield the same utility for him. Thus assigning Pj deterministically to the one with the smallest
cost leads to another equilibrium assignment with the same social welfare and still meeting the
budget constraint. Accordingly, to maximize social welfare it suffices to consider only deterministic
assignments.
The following theorem shows that even the optimal deterministic assignments are hard to find
in general.
Theorem 1. Finding optimal equilibrium assignments is NP -hard.
Proof. The reduction is from the knapsack problem, which is well known to be NP -hard. In this
problem there are k items, a1, . . . , ak, and each ai has value vi and cost ci. We are also given a
budget B, and the goal is to select a subset of items so as to maximize their total value while
keeping their total cost less than or equal to B.
We can transform this problem to a Provision-after-Wait problem with k+1 hospitals and
k patients. Each hospital Hi with 1 ≤ i ≤ k has cost ci, and each patient Pi has value vi for Hi
and 0 for all others. Hospital Hk+1 has cost 0 and is valued 0 by all patients. The government has
budget B.
Given an equilibrium assignment (w, h, λ) to the Provision-after-Wait problem, we can
construct a solution to the knapsack problem with total value equal to SW (w, h, λ) —the set
A = {i : h(i) = i} is such a solution. Indeed, without loss of generality we can assume h(i) = k+1
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whenever h(i) 6= i. By the definition of equilibrium assignments, we can also assume wk+1 = 0,
wi = vi if h(i) = k + 1, and wi = 0 otherwise. Thus SW (w, h, λ) =
∑
i∈A vi, which is the total
value of A in the knapsack problem. As the total cost of (w, h, λ) is
∑
i∈A ci ≤ B, the set A meets
the budget constraint in the knapsack problem.
It is easy to see that the other direction is also true, that is, given a solution A ⊆ [k] to the
knapsack problem, we can construct an equilibrium assignment (w, h, λ) for the Provision-after-
Wait problem whose social welfare equals the total value of A.
Accordingly, an optimal equilibrium assignment to Provision-after-Wait corresponds to an
optimal solution to knapsack.
Remark 3. The NP-hardness of the knapsack problem comes from the need for integrality. Its
fractional version can be easily solved using a greedy bang-per-buck approach. But this is not the
case in our problem. Indeed, as we have noted, given a fractional equilibrium assignment we can
construct a deterministic equilibrium assignment with the same social welfare. Thus for our problem
the fractional version is as hard as the integral version.
4 Approximating Optimal Equilibrium Assignments with
Arbitrarily Small Deficit
Although the optimization problem is hard when both the numbers of patients and hospitals are
large, in practice we expect the number of hospitals to be small, and it makes sense to solve the
problem efficiently in this case.
An easy observation is that optimal equilibrium assignments can be found in timeO(mkpoly(m,k)).
Indeed, there are at most mk possible assignment functions h : [m]→ [k]. For each h and the cor-
responding quota vector λ satisfying
∑
i∈[k] ciλi ≤ B, the total value of the patients are fixed, and
thus maximizing social welfare is equivalent to minimizing total waiting time. Accordingly, the
best equilibrium waiting time vector given h and λ can be found using the linear program below
(or one can prove that no feasible waiting time vector exists at equilibrium).
min
w
∑
i∈[k]
wiλi
s.t. ∀j ∈ [m], i ∈ [k], vh(j)j − wh(j) ≥ vij − wi.
We then choose h such that the corresponding equilibrium assignment (w, h, λ) maximizes social
welfare.
Given the above observation, we are interested in replacing the mk part with a better bound.
As we shall show, if the government is willing to violate its budget constraint by an arbitrarily
small fraction, then the problem can be solved much more efficiently.
Definition 2. Let ǫ be a positive constant. An assignment (w, h, λ) is an equilibrium assignment
with ǫ-deficit if it is an equilibrium assignment with the feasibility condition replaced by the following
condition:
∑
i∈[k] λici ≤ (1 + ǫ)B.
We shall construct an algorithm that, in time O(logk1+ǫm · (1 + ǫ)
3m4), finds an equilibrium
assignment with ǫ-deficit whose social welfare is at least SWOEA, the social welfare of the optimal
equilibrium assignments with budget B. To do so, we first establish a strong connection between
the Provision-after-Wait problem and the well-studied problem of unit-demand auctions (see,
e.g., [7, 1, 3, 8]).
10
4.1 A connection between the Provision-After-Wait problem and unit-demand
auctions
A unit-demand auction is specified by n goods (perhaps including identical ones), m buyers, and
the values vij of each buyer j ∈ [m] for each good i ∈ [n]. The goal is to find an equilibrium
allocation and prices, where each buyer gets the good that maximizes his utility given the prices.
If we consider the patients in the Provision-after-Wait problem as buyers who want to buy
hospital services using waiting times, our setting looks a lot like a unit-demand auction. Except
one thing: in our setting the set of goods for sale is unknown. It is natural to consider the k
hospitals as k goods, but each one of them has to have certain amount of identical copies, as each
hospital may serve more than one patients. One cannot simply model the hospitals as k goods with
m copies each, as then the resulted auction will give each patient his favorite hospital with zero
waiting time, and the budget constraint may be broken.
Notice that, if we were given the quota vector λ in the optimal equilibrium solution of the
Provision-after-Wait problem, then we can consider each hospital Hi as λi copies of identical
goods, and we have a well defined unit-demand auction. Every equilibrium solution to this auction
leads to an assignment function h and a waiting time vector w, such that (w, h, λ) is an equilibrium
assignment to the original Provision-after-Wait problem. In particular, the budget constraint
is satisfied automatically, since we started with a quota vector that meets the budget constraint.
In general, for any quota vector λ such that
∑
i λi ≥ m, the problem of finding equilibrium
assignments with respect to λ reduces to finding equilibrium prices and allocations in unit-demand
auctions where each hospital Hi corresponds to λi identical goods. If λ meets the budget constraint,
namely,
∑
i ciλi ≤ B, then the resulting equilibrium assignment meets the budget constraint.
It is well known that a unit-demand auction always has equilibrium prices and allocations,
which can be found by the Hungarian method [18]. The only caution is that, for a hospital to have
a well-defined waiting time, the prices of its corresponding goods in the unit-demand auction must
be all the same. Fortunately, as will become clear in Section 4.2, at equilibrium identical goods
must always have the same price, although this is not explicitly required.
Therefore for each quota vector λ, whether it meets the budget constraint or not, there exists
an equilibrium assignment with respect to λ. Following the result of [1], the optimal equilibrium
assignment with respect to λ can be computed efficiently, and this will lead to our algorithm for
approximating the optimal equilibrium solution of the Provision-after-Wait problem.11
4.2 A useful result in multi-unit auctions
Our algorithm uses that of [1] for unit-demand auctions as a black box, therefore we first recall
their result (while using our notation to help establish the connection with our results).
Definition 3. A unit-demand auction, or simply an auction in this paper, is a triple (g,m, v),
where the set of goods is {1, 2, . . . , g}, the set of bidders is {1, 2, . . . ,m}, and v is the valuation
matrix, that is, a g ×m matrix of non-negative integers. Each vij denotes the valuation of bidder
j for good i.
Given an auction (g,m, v), a matching is a triple (u, p, µ), where u = (u1, . . . , um) ∈ (Z
+)m
is the utility vector, p = (p1, . . . , pg) ∈ (Z
+)g is the price vector, and µ ⊆ [g] × [m] is a set of
good-bidder pairs such that no bidder and no good occur in more than one pair. Bidders and goods
that do not appear in any pair in µ are unmatched.
11Although equilibrium assignments can be efficiently computed given λ, the problem of deciding the “correct” λ
makes the Provision-after-Wait problem hard, even in very special cases, as shown in Section 3.
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Definition 4. Given an auction (g,m, v), a matching (u, p, µ) is weakly feasible if for each (i, j) ∈ µ
we have uj = vij − pi, and for each unmatched bidder j we have uj = 0.
A matching (u, p, µ) is feasible if it is weakly feasible and for each unmatched good i we have
pi = 0.
A matching (u, p, µ) is stable if for each (i, j) ∈ [g] × [m] we have uj ≥ vij − pi.
A matching (u∗, p∗, µ∗) is bidder-optimal if: (1) it is stable and feasible, and (2) for every
matching (u, p, µ) that is stable and weakly feasible, and for every bidder j, we have u∗j ≥ uj .
In [1] the authors construct an algorithm, StableMatch, which, given an auction (g,m, v),
outputs a bidder-optimal matching (u∗, p∗, µ∗) in time O(mg3).
Notice that the original definitions in [1] have for each good-bidder pair a reserve price and a
maximum price. In our model we do not need them, so the definitions above are more succinct
than the original ones. In fact, as pointed out by [1], with maximum prices, there may be no
bidder-optimal matching. But without them such a matching always exists, as shown by [7].
Notice also that [1] does not distinguish between weak feasibility and feasibility. But it is easy
to see that their algorithm and its analysis still apply under our definitions. We shall use these two
notions when analyzing our algorithm.
Next we establish two properties for the matching (u∗, p∗, µ∗) output by StableMatch.
• Property 1. If g ≥ m, then without loss of generality we can assume that (u∗, p∗, µ∗) has no
unmatched bidder.
Indeed, if there exists an unmatched bidder j, then there must exist an unmatched good i
(since g ≥ m). Since (u∗, p∗, µ∗) is bidder-optimal, we have u∗j = 0, p
∗
i = 0, and u
∗
j ≥ vij − p
∗
i .
Thus we have vij = 0, and the matching (u
∗, p∗, µ∗ ∪ {(i, j)}) is another bidder-optimal
matching.
• Property 2. If two goods i, i′ are identical, namely, vij = vi′j for each bidder j, then p
∗
i = p
∗
i′ .
Indeed, if both goods are unmatched then p∗i = p
∗
i′ = 0. Otherwise, say (i, j) ∈ µ
∗. By
definition, u∗j = vij − p
∗
i ≥ vi′j − p
∗
i′ . As vij = vi′j , we have p
∗
i ≤ p
∗
i′ . If i
′ is unmatched then
p∗i′ = 0, implying p
∗
i = 0. If (i
′, j′) ∈ µ∗ then similarly we have p∗i′ ≤ p
∗
i , and thus p
∗
i = p
∗
i′
again.
4.3 Our algorithm for approximating optimal equilibrium assignments
Now we are ready to construct our algorithm for approximating optimal equilibrium assignments.
The algorithm takes as input the number of patients m, the number of hospitals k, the hospitals’
costs c1, . . . , ck, the patients’ valuations vij ’s for the hospitals, the budget B, and a small constant
ǫ > 0. Letting (w, h, λ) be an optimal equilibrium assignment, the algorithm works by guessing
λ, constructing a multi-unit auction based on the guessed vector, computing the bidder-optimal
matching using StableMatch, and extracting the waiting time vector and the assignment function
from the matching.
More precisely, let L , ⌈log1+ǫm⌉, C0 , 0, and Cℓ , ⌊(1 + ǫ)
ℓ⌋ for each ℓ = 1, . . . , L. The
algorithm examines all the vectors λˆ = (λˆ1, . . . , λˆk) ∈ {C0, C1, . . . , CL}
k one by one, say lexico-
graphically.
If
∑
i∈[k] λˆi 6∈ [m, (1 + ǫ)m] or if
∑
i∈[k] λˆici > (1 + ǫ)B, the algorithm disregards this vector
and moves to the next. Otherwise it constructs an auction (g,m, vˆ) as follows. The set of patients
corresponds to the set of bidders; each hospital Hi corresponds to λˆi copies of identical goods
Hi1, . . . ,Hiλˆi , thus g =
∑
i∈[k] λˆi; the valuation matrix vˆ has rows indexed by {ir : i ∈ [k], r ∈ [λˆi]},
columns indexed by [m], and for each j ∈ [m], i ∈ [k], and r ∈ [λˆi], vˆir,j = vij.
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The algorithm then runs StableMatch with input (g,m, vˆ) to generate the bidder-optimal
matching (u∗, p∗, µ∗), and extracts the waiting time vector wˆ and the assignment function hˆ as
follows. For each hospital Hi, let wˆi = p
∗
i1. For each patient Pj, let Hir be the unique good to
which Pj is matched (by Property 1 in Section 4.2 such a good always exists) according to µ
∗, and
let hˆ(j) = i. The triple (wˆ, hˆ, λˆ) may not be an assignment as
∑
i∈[k] λˆi may be larger than m, but
there is a unique quota vector λˆ′ such that (wˆ, hˆ, λˆ′) is an assignment.
The algorithm computes the social welfare of the assignment (wˆ, hˆ, λˆ′) for each λˆ that is not
disregarded, and output the assignment (w∗, h∗, λ∗) with the maximum social welfare.
We prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Our algorithm runs in time O(logk1+ǫm ·m
4), and outputs an equilibrium assignment
with ǫ-deficit, (w∗, h∗, λ∗), such that SW (w∗, h∗, λ∗) ≥ SWOEA.
Proof. The running time of the algorithm can be immediately seen. Indeed, if a vector λˆ is not
disregarded, then it takes O(mg) = O(m2) time to construct the auction as g ∈ [m, (1 + ǫ)m],
O(mg3) = O(m4) time to run StableMatch, and O(m) time to extract the assignment. Ac-
cordingly, it takes O(m4) time to examine a single vector λˆ, and there are O(logk1+ǫm) vectors in
total.
The remaining part of the theorem follows from the two lemmas below.
Lemma 1. (w∗, h∗, λ∗) is an equilibrium assignment with ǫ-deficit.
Proof. In fact, we show that for each vector λˆ that is not disregarded, the extracted assignment
(wˆ, hˆ, λˆ′) is an equilibrium assignment with ǫ-deficit. To see why this is true, first notice that∑
i∈[k] λˆici ≤ (1 + ǫ)B by the construction of the algorithm, thus∑
i∈[k]
λˆ′ici ≤
∑
i∈[k]
λˆici ≤ (1 + ǫ)B. (1)
Second, for each j ∈ [m], letting H
hˆ(j)r be the good matched to Pj according to µ
∗, we have
uj(wˆ, hˆ, λˆ
′) = v
hˆ(j)j − wˆhˆ(j) = vˆhˆ(j)r,j − p
∗
hˆ(j)1
= vˆ
hˆ(j)r,j − p
∗
hˆ(j)r
= u∗j ≥ 0, (2)
where the third equality is because of Property 2 in Section 4.2 (in particular, H
hˆ(j)1 and Hhˆ(j)r
are identical goods, and p∗
hˆ(j)1
= p∗
hˆ(j)r
), and the other equalities/inequality are by definition.
Third, since (u∗, p∗, µ∗) is a bidder-optimal matching for auction (g,m, vˆ), we have that for each
j ∈ [m], i ∈ [k], and r ∈ [λˆi],
u∗j ≥ vˆir,j − p
∗
ir = vij − p
∗
i1 = vij − wˆi,
and thus
uj(wˆ, hˆ, λˆ
′) = u∗j ≥ vij − wˆi. (3)
Equations 1, 2, and 3 together imply that every (wˆ, hˆ, λˆ′) is an equilibrium assignment with
ǫ-deficit, and so is (w∗, h∗, λ∗).
Lemma 2. SW (w∗, h∗, λ∗) ≥ SWOEA.
13
Proof. To see why this is true, arbitrarily fix an optimal equilibrium assignment (w, h, λ). Notice
that for each hospital Hi, there exists a “good guess” λˆi ∈ {C0, . . . , CL} such that
λi ≤ λˆi ≤ (1 + ǫ)λi.
Since λ satisfies
∑
i∈[k] λi = m and
∑
i∈[k] λici ≤ B, the vector λˆ = (λˆ1, . . . , λˆk) satisfies∑
i∈[k]
λˆi ∈ [m, (1 + ǫ)m] and
∑
i∈[k]
λˆici ≤ (1 + ǫ)B.
Thus it won’t be disregarded by the algorithm. Let (g,m, vˆ) be the auction constructed from
λˆ, (u∗, p∗, µ∗) the output of StableMatch under input (g,m, vˆ), and (wˆ, hˆ, λˆ′) the assignment
extracted from (u∗, p∗, µ∗). Following the same reasoning as in Equation 2, we have that for each
j ∈ [m], uj(wˆ, hˆ, λˆ
′) = u∗j . Thus
SW (wˆ, hˆ, λˆ′) =
∑
j∈[m]
u∗j . (4)
From (w, h, λ), we construct a matching (u, p, µ) for the auction (g,m, vˆ) as follows. For each
bidder j, we have uj = vh(j)j −wh(j); for each good Hir with i ∈ [k] and r ∈ [λˆi], we have pir = wi;
and for each hospital Hi, letting j1 ≤ j2 ≤ · · · ≤ jλi be the patients assigned to Hi by h, we have
µ = {(jr, ir) : i ∈ [k], r ∈ [λi]}.
It is easy to verify that the so constructed (u, p, µ) is stable and weakly feasible, thus by the
optimality of u∗ we have that for each j ∈ [m],
u∗j ≥ uj . (5)
Moreover, for the same reason as Equation 4, we have
SW (w, h, λ) =
∑
j∈[m]
uj. (6)
Equations 4, 5, and 6 together imply
SW (wˆ, hˆ, λˆ′) ≥ SW (w, h, λ) = SWOEA
as we want to show.
In sum, Theorem 2 holds.
Remark. By running our algorithm with input budget B/(1+ǫ), we obtain an assignment whose
budget is at most B and whose social welfare is at least the optimal social welfare with budget
B/(1 + ǫ). However, this social welfare may be much smaller than the optimal social welfare with
budget B. That is why we insist on having a deficit instead of meeting the budget constraint
strictly.
5 The Endogenous Emergence of Waiting Times
Next we study the dynamics between hospitals and patients. As we shall consider continuous
changes of waiting times, below the patients’ valuations and the waiting times can be any non-
negative reals, not necessarily integers.We show that in our model, when the patients’ valuations
are in some generic position, the only thing the government needs to enforce is the amount of money
it is willing to pay to each hospital, which can be equivalently enforced by the quota vector. Given
the quotas, the optimal waiting times and the optimal social welfare will emerge endogenously from
the dynamics.
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5.1 The uniqueness of the optimal equilibrium
We start by defining the generic position of the patients and studying the structure of the optimal
equilibrium under it. Following [3], we have the following.
Definition 5. The patients {P1, . . . , Pm} with valuations (vij)i∈[k],j∈[m] are independent if, there
do not exist two different subsets S and T of the multiset {vij : i ∈ [k], j ∈ [m]} such that, both S
and T contains positive numbers and
∑
v∈S v =
∑
v′∈T v
′.
Notice that the above definition of independent patients is weaker than the typical definition of
generic position, which rules out any relevant equality relation among the valuations. Notice also
that it is easy to perturb the numbers in the proof of Theorem 1 so that the resulted Provision-
after-Wait problem is generic. Thus the optimization problem is still NP-hard in the generic case.
But our results below apply to any λ, which may be obtained via approximation algorithms or
heuristics.
Let λ be a quota vector with
∑
i∈[k] λi ≥ m.
12 Recall that given λ, the Provision-after-Wait
problem reduces to a unit-demand auction. Thus following [25, 7], among all equilibrium waiting
time vectors with respect to λ, there is a unique one that simultaneously minimizes the waiting
time at each hospital and maximizes the utility of each patient.13 Denoting this minimum waiting
time vector by w¯, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Assuming the patients are independent, there is a unique equilibrium assignment with
respect to λ and w¯. Moreover, denoting this equilibrium by (w¯, h¯, λ), we have that mini∈[k] w¯i = 0,
and that at this equilibrium every hospital with positive waiting time is saturated, namely, |h¯−1(i)| =
λi whenever w¯i > 0.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume λi > 0 for each i ∈ [k]. Consider the demand graph
G given w¯, that is, a bipartite graph with k nodes on one side for the hospitals and m nodes on
the other side for the patients. For each i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [m], the edge (i, j) is in G if and only if
Hi maximizes Pj ’s utility, namely, vij − w¯i = maxi′∈[k] vi′j − w¯i′ . By definition, any equilibrium
assignment must assigns each patient Pj to an adjacent hospital Hi. Thus it suffices to show that
within each connected component of G there is only one equilibrium assignment. We start by
proving the following claim.
Claim 1. There is no cycle in G.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume there exists a (necessarily even-length) cycle
(i1, j1, i2, j2, . . . , iℓ, jℓ, i1), where ir’s are hospitals and jr’s are patients. By the construction of G,
we have that for each r ∈ [ℓ], both Hir and Hir+1 maximize Pjr ’s utility, with ℓ + 1 defined to be
1. Thus
virjr − w¯ir = vir+1jr − w¯ir+1 .
Summing all ℓ equations together, we have∑
r∈[ℓ]
(virjr − w¯ir) =
∑
r∈[ℓ]
(
vir+1jr − w¯ir+1
)
,
therefore, ∑
r∈[ℓ]
virjr −
∑
r∈[ℓ]
w¯ir =
∑
r∈[ℓ]
vir+1jr −
∑
r∈[ℓ]
w¯ir+1 .
12Notice that we do not require that λ satisfies the budget constraint, and our results apply to such λs as well.
13Notice that this is the waiting time vector computed by the StableMatch algorithm of [1].
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As
∑
r∈[ℓ] w¯ir =
∑
r∈[ℓ] w¯ir+1 , we have∑
r∈[ℓ]
virjr =
∑
r∈[ℓ]
vir+1jr .
Accordingly, we have found two different subsets {virjr : r ∈ [ℓ]} and {vir+1jr : r ∈ [ℓ]} that sum up
to the same value, contradicting the hypothesis that the patients are independent.
Following Claim 1, the connected components of G are all trees. Similarly, we have the following:
Claim 2. Each connected component of G contains at most one hospital with waiting time 0.
Proof. Again for the sake of contradiction, assume there is a connected component with two different
hospitals Hi and Hi′ such that w¯i = w¯i′ = 0. Accordingly, there is a path (i1, j1, i2, j2, . . . , iℓ) where
ir’s are hospitals and jr’s are patients, such that i1 = i and iℓ = i
′. Similar to the proof of Claim
1, for each r < ℓ, we have
virjr − w¯ir = vir+1jr − w¯ir+1 .
Summing all ℓ− 1 equations together, we have
ℓ−1∑
r=1
virjr −
ℓ−1∑
r=1
w¯ir =
ℓ−1∑
r=1
vir+1jr −
ℓ−1∑
r=1
w¯ir+1 .
As w¯i1 = w¯iℓ = 0, the above equation implies
ℓ−1∑
r=1
virjr −
ℓ−1∑
r=2
w¯ir =
ℓ−1∑
r=1
vir+1jr −
ℓ−1∑
r=2
w¯ir ,
and thus
ℓ−1∑
r=1
virjr =
ℓ−1∑
r=1
vir+1jr ,
again contradicting the hypothesis that the patients are independent.
Claim 2 and the following claim together imply that each connected component of G has exactly
one hospital with waiting time 0.
Claim 3. Each connected component of G has at least one hospital with waiting time 0.
Proof. By contradiction. Assume there is a component C such that w¯i > 0 for each Hi in C. Let
ǫ1 = min
Hi∈C
w¯i.
Notice that for each Pj not in C, by definition, the best utility that j can get from hospitals in C
is strictly less than umaxj , the best utility that j can get from his favorite hospital. Let
ǫ2 = min
Pj 6∈C
[
umaxj − max
Hi∈C
(vij − w¯i)
]
.
We have ǫ1 > 0 and ǫ2 > 0. Let ǫ =
min{ǫ1,ǫ2}
2 , w
′
i = w¯i − ǫ for each Hi ∈ C, and w
′ = (w¯−C , w
′
C).
That is, w′ is w¯ with all waiting times of hospitals in C reduced by ǫ. As ǫ < ǫ1, w
′ is a valid
waiting time vector.
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Notice that for any equilibrium assignment (w¯, h, λ), the assignment (w′, h, λ) is still an equi-
librium. Indeed, when the waiting time vector changes from w¯ to w′, for each patient Pj , his utility
at every hospital Hi ∈ C increases by ǫ, and his utility at every other hospital remains the same.
For Pj 6∈ C, ǫ < ǫ2, and thus the best utility j gets from C is still smaller than u
max
j , which is j’s
utility at Hh(j) 6∈ C. For Pj ∈ C, we have Hh(j) ∈ C as well, and Hh(j) still maximizes j’s utility
after the increase.
Accordingly, w′ is another equilibrium waiting time vector. But w′i < w¯i for each Hi ∈ C and
w′i = w¯i for each Hi 6∈ C, contradicting the hypothesis that w¯ minimizes the waiting time of each
hospital among all equilibrium waiting time vectors. Therefore Claim 3 holds.
Following Claims 1, 2, and 3, each connected component C can be considered as a tree rooted
at the unique hospital with waiting time 0, with hospitals and patients alternating along each path.
Based on this structure, we show that there is only one way of assigning the patients to the hospitals
at equilibrium in C. To do so, we need the following:
Claim 4. For each hospital Hi ∈ C with w¯i > 0, the degree of Hi in G is strictly larger than its
quota λi.
The proof is similar to that of Claim 3: if the degree of some Hi ∈ C is at most λi, then we
can find a proper value ǫ ∈ (0, w¯i) such that the vector w
′ , (w¯−i, w¯i − ǫ) is still an equilibrium
waiting time vector. Indeed, with properly chosen ǫ, for every equilibrium (w¯, h, λ), let h′ be the
assignment such that h′(j) = i if Pj is adjacent to Hi (this is doable because the degree of Hi is at
most λi), and h
′(j) = h(j) otherwise. Then (w′, h′, λ) is another equilibrium. But this contradicts
the hypothesis that w¯ minimizes the waiting time of each hospital among all equilibrium waiting
time vectors. The formal analysis is omitted.
Following Claim 4, we have that the leaves of tree C are all patients. Indeed, if there is a hospital
with degree 1 and positive waiting time, then its quota is 0, contradicting our original assumption
that all hospitals have positive quotas. Accordingly, at every equilibrium, every patient at a leaf
must be assigned to his preceding hospital, as this is the only one maximizing his utility. Letting
Hi be a non-root hospital whose descendants are all leaves, we have that the number of descendants
of Hi, denoted by di, is at most λi, otherwise no equilibrium exists. As w¯i > 0, by Claim 4 we
have that the degree of Hi is strictly larger than λi, which implies di ≥ λi. Accordingly, Hi uses
up all its quota to serve its descendants, and the patient Pj preceding Hi must be assigned to his
preceding hospital.
Repeating the above reasoning in a bottom-up way along the tree, we have that there is only
one way of assigning the patients to hospitals at equilibrium with respect to λ and w¯, that is,
each patient is assigned to his predecessor in G, and every hospital with positive waiting time is
saturated by its descendants. Thus Theorem 3 holds.
By definition, the equilibrium (w¯, h¯, λ) maximizes social welfare with respect to λ, thus it is
reasonable to assume that this is the equilibrium that the government aims to implement.
5.2 The dynamics between hospitals and patients
We now show that given λ, the waiting time vector w¯ will endogenously emerge from the dynamics
between hospitals and patients, and so will h¯. We consider a continuous-time dynamics, where
the patient population arrives continuously and uniformly along time. In such a dynamics, the
quota-vector λ represents the service rate of the hospitals that the government is willing to pay
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for. Namely, for each hospital Hi, the total number of patients paid by the government in any time
interval (t1, t2) is at most λi(t2 − t1).
14
The set of patients in previous sections, {P1, . . . , Pm} with valuations (vij)i∈[k],j∈[m], now rep-
resents the set of types of the arriving patients. That is, although the patient population goes to
infinity, there are only finitely many types of them. Every type has arrival rate 1: by any time t,
the number of patients that have arrived is mt, where t of them are of type P1 (i.e., with valuation
(v1j , . . . , vkj)), and another t of them are of type P2, etc. We say that the patient population is
independent if {P1, . . . , Pm} is independent. Notice that in general there may be different Pj and
Pj′ with the same valuation, and the number of patients of a particular type by time t may be
larger than t. But when the population is independent, any different Pj and Pj′ must have different
valuations, and indeed represent different types. Below we consider independent population.
Let w(t) , (w1(t), . . . , wk(t)) be the non-negative waiting time vector of the hospitals at time
t, such that w(0) = (0, . . . , 0). A patient of type Pj arriving at time t chooses a hospital Hi
maximizing his utility given w(t), and will be served there at time t + wi(t).
15 To break ties
consistently throughout time, we impose a partial ordering over the hospitals, according to their
positions in the demand graph G with respect to w¯. In particular, if Hi and Hi′ are in the same
connected component of G and Hi precedes Hi′ , then at any time t and for any patient of type
Pj whose utility is maximized at both Hi and Hi′ given w(t), we assume that Pj does not choose
Hi. If Hi and Hi′ are in different connected components, then Pj can choose one arbitrarily, or
even split the population of this type arbitrarily between Hi and Hi′ , as indicated by the definition
below.
Definition 6. For any i, j, t, the demand rate of Pj for Hi at time t, denoted by dij(t), is a number
in [0, 1] such that,
•
∑
i∈[k] dij(t) = 1 for all j,
• dij(t) > 0 only if Hi maximizes Pj ’s utility at time t, and there is no other hospital Hi′
preceded by Hi in the same connected component of G that does so.
The demand rate for Hi at time t is di(t) ,
∑
j∈[m] dij(t).
The fractional values of the dij ’s indicate how the patients of the same type will split between
all hospitals maximizing their utilities. For example, dij(t) = 1/3 means that fixing the current
waiting times, in the long run a third of the patients of type Pj will choose Hi. Notice that we do
not completely specify how the patients should make their decisions when there are ties, and yet
our results hold no matter how these ties are broken.
Because the patients arrive continuously under a constant rate, their effect on the waiting times
at any point of time is infinitesimal, and w(t) is continuous. By definition, within an arbitrarily
small time interval (t, t + δ), the number of patients choosing Hi is di(t)δ. Since the number of
patients served by Hi in time δ is λiδ, the waiting time will not change if di(t) = λi (i.e., if the
demand rate matches the service rate), and will change by di(t)δ−λiδ
λi
otherwise, unless wi(t) = 0
and di(t) < λi, in which case wi(t+ δ) will remain 0. That is,
wi(t+ δ) − wi(t) =
{ (
di(t)
λi
− 1
)
δ if wi(t) > 0 or di(t) ≥ λi,
0 otherwise.
(7)
14The budget constraint B now represents the spending rate of the government: the total amount of money the
government can afford by time t is Bt. But as already said, our conclusion in this section holds even when λ does
not satisfy the budget constraint. Thus we shall not talk about the budget constraint in the remaining part of this
section.
15So the patients are served in a first-in-first-out queue.
18
Accordingly, for each i ∈ [k] the right derivative of wi(t) is
d+wi(t)
dt
=
{
limδ→0
wi(t+δ)−wi(t)
δ
= di(t)
λi
− 1 if wi(t) > 0 or di(t) ≥ λi,
0 otherwise.
(8)
Notice that for particular tie-breaking rules, the function di(t) may not be continuous, and thus
wi(t) may not be differentiable. But we can always define its right derivative as above.
We say that w(t) is at most w¯, written as w(t) ≤ w¯, if wi(t) ≤ w¯i for each i ∈ [k]. Moreover, we
say that w(t) is smaller than w¯, written as w(t) < w¯, if the above inequality holds for some i ∈ [k].
The following two theorems show that the dynamics will always converge to w¯ in finite time, and
will never exceed w¯ before converging.
Theorem 4. When the patient population is independent we have that:
(1) w(t) ≤ w¯ for any t ≥ 0;
(2) if w(t) = w¯ then d+wi(t)
dt
= 0 for any i ∈ [k]; and
(3) if w(t) < w¯ then there exists i ∈ [k] such that d+wi(t)
dt
> 0.
Proof. To prove Statement (1), it suffices to show that whenever w(t) ≤ w¯ and wi(t) = w¯i for
some i, we have di(t) ≤ λi and thus wi(t) will not increase. Since |h¯
−1(i)| ≤ λi by the definition of
equilibrium (w¯, h¯, λ), it suffices to show
di(t) ≤ |h¯
−1(i)|,
or equivalently, to show that
if h¯(j) 6= i then dij(t) = 0.
To do so, arbitrarily fix a type Pj such that h¯(j) 6= i. If vij − wi(t) < maxi′ vi′j − wi′(t) then
certainly Pj does not choose Hi given w(t), and dij(t) = 0. Assume now
vij −wi(t) = max
i′
vi′j − wi′(t).
Notice that
vij − wi(t) = vij − w¯i ≤ vh¯(j)j − w¯h¯(j) ≤ vh¯(j)j − wh¯(j)(t) ≤ max
i′
vi′j − wi′(t),
where the equality is because wi(t) = w¯i, the first and the last inequalities are by definition, and
the second is because wh¯(j)(t) ≤ w¯h¯(j) by hypothesis. Thus we have
vij − wi(t) = vij − w¯i = vh¯(j)j − w¯h¯(j) = vh¯(j)j − wh¯(j)(t) = max
i′
vi′j − wi′(t).
The second equality implies that both Hi and Hh¯(j) are adjacent to Pj in the demand graph G
according to w¯, and thus it must be the case that Hh¯(j) precedes Pj and Pj precedes Hi in G. The
last equality implies that Hh¯(j) also maximizes the utility of Pj given w(t), and thus Pj will not
choose Hi according to our tie-breaking rule, namely, dij(t) = 0.
Accordingly, di(t) ≤ |h¯
−1(i)| ≤ λi, and Statement (1) holds.
Statement (2) simply follows from the fact that, when w(t) = w¯, the patients choose their
hospitals according to the unique equilibrium (w¯, h¯, λ), and thus di(t) = |h¯
−1(i)| = λi for every i
such that w¯i > 0, and di(t) = |h¯
−1(i)| ≤ λi for every i such that w¯i = 0.
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To prove Statement (3), it suffices to show that when w(t) < w¯, there exists some hospital Hi
with di(t) > λi. For the sake of contradiction, assume di(t) ≤ λi ∀i. We shall construct a new
demand vector (d′ij(t))i∈[k],j∈[m] such that
d′ij(t) ∈ {0, 1} ∀i, j, and d
′
i(t) ,
∑
j
d′ij(t) ≤ λi ∀i.
To do so, consider the demand graph G(t) with respect to w(t). For each Hi and Pj , dij(t) > 0
implies that Hi and Pj are adjacent in G(t). Since the patient population is independent, G(t) is
a forest with hospitals and patients alternating along each path, as in the proof of Theorem 3.
The construction starts from the graph G(t), processes and removes its nodes step by step and
in a bottom-up fashion, and assigns patients to hospitals in a greedy way. To be more precise, we
initialize the following intermediate variables: d′ij(t) = 0 ∀i, j, and λ
′
i = λi ∀i. At any time of the
construction, for each Hi, λ
′
i is an integer and denotes Hi’s remaining quota, after some patients
have been assigned to it. It will be invariant that
d′i(t) + λ
′
i = λi ∀i, di(t) ≤ λ
′
i ∀i, and
∑
i∈[k]
dij(t) = 1 ∀Pj in the graph. (9)
Notice that Equation (9) trivially holds at the beginning.
In each step of the construction, from the remaining graph, we choose a leaf with the longest
path from its root. We distinguish two cases.
Case 1. The chosen leaf is a patient, say Pj∗ .
This is the simpler case. Letting the unique adjacent hospital be Hi∗ , we have
dij∗(t) = 0 ∀i 6= i
∗, and di∗j∗(t) = 1 ≤ di∗(t) ≤ λ
′
i∗ .
Set d′i∗j∗(t) = 1, di∗j∗(t) = 0, and λ
′
i∗ = λ
′
i∗ − 1, and remove Pj∗ from the graph. That is, Pj∗
is assigned to Hi∗ and occupies 1 quota there. Notice that the invariance remains. Indeed,
d′i∗(t) increases by 1 and λ
′
i∗ decreases by 1, both di∗(t) and λ
′
i∗ decrease by 1, and everything
else remains unchanged.
Case 2. The chosen leaf is a hospital, say Hi∗.
This is the more complicated case. Letting the unique adjacent patient be Pj∗, we have
0 ≤ di∗j∗(t) = di∗(t) ≤ λ
′
i∗ .
If λ′i∗ ≥ 1 (namely, Hi∗ still has quota for one more patient), then set d
′
i∗j∗(t) = 1, dij∗(t) = 0
∀i, and λ′i∗ = λ
′
i∗−1. Remove Pj∗ and its children (which are all leaves) from the graph. That
is, Pj∗ is assigned to Hi∗ , and for any other hospital Hi with Pj∗ the only adjacent patient,
no patient will be assigned to it any more. Notice that the invariance remains. Indeed, d′i∗(t)
increases by 1, λ′i∗ decreases by 1, di∗(t) = di∗j∗(t) = 0, λ
′
i∗ is non-negative, and for any i 6= i
∗,
di(t) either decreases or remains unchanged. Everything else remains unchanged.
If λ′i∗ = 0, then di∗j∗(t) = di∗(t) = 0 by Equation (9). That is, no remaining patient wants
Hi∗ . We simply remove Hi∗ from the graph, keeping the invariance.
Notice that we finish processing all nodes after at most m+ k steps. In the end, all the d′ij(t)’s are
either 0 or 1, and d′i(t) ≤ λi ∀i. Accordingly, the d
′
ij(t)’s correspond to an equilibrium assignment
with waiting time w(t), contradicting the fact that w¯ is the minimum equilibrium waiting time
vector with respect to λ.
Therefore Statement (3) holds.
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Letting MSW =
∑
j∈[m]maxi∈[k] vij and λmax = maxi∈[k] λi, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 5. When the patient population is independent, the dynamics converges to w¯ in time at
most 2kλmaxMSW .
Proof. Similar to the Hungarian method (see, e.g., [8]), we consider the following potential function:
P (t) ,
∑
i∈[k]
λiwi(t) +
∑
j∈[m]
uj(t),
where uj(t) , maxi∈[k] (vij − wi(t)). Since wi(t) is continuous for each i ∈ [k], uj(t) is continuous
for each j ∈ [m], and P (t) is continuous as well.
By Theorem 3 we have mini∈[k] w¯i = 0. By Theorem 4 we have that before the dynamics
converges, (0, . . . , 0) ≤ w(t) < w¯ for any t, and thus mini∈[k]wi(t) = mini∈[k] w¯i = 0. Accordingly,
uj(t) ≥ 0 for each Pj , and P (t) ≥ 0. As P (0) =MSW to begin with, it suffices to prove that P (t)
strictly decreases, and the local decreasing rate is at least 1/(kλmax).
To do so, notice that
P (t) =
∑
i
λiwi(t) +
∑
j
∑
i
dij(t)(vij − wi(t))
=
∑
i
λiwi(t)−
∑
i
(
∑
j
dij(t))wi(t) +
∑
i,j
dij(t)vij
=
∑
i
(λi − di(t))wi(t) +
∑
i,j
dij(t)vij .
Thus for any arbitrarily small δ > 0, by definition we have
P (t+ δ)− P (t)
=
∑
i
(λi − di(t+ δ))wi(t+ δ) − (λi − di(t))wi(t) +
∑
i,j
dij(t+ δ)vij −
∑
i,j
dij(t)vij
=
∑
i
(wi(t+ δ)− wi(t))(λi − di(t))−
∑
i
wi(t+ δ)di(t+ δ) +
∑
i
wi(t+ δ)di(t)
+
∑
i,j
dij(t+ δ)vij −
∑
i,j
dij(t)vij
=
∑
i
(wi(t+ δ)− wi(t))(λi − di(t)) +
∑
i,j
dij(t+ δ)vij −
∑
i,j
dij(t+ δ)wi(t+ δ)
−
∑
i,j
dij(t)vij +
∑
i,j
dij(t)wi(t+ δ)
=
∑
i
(wi(t+ δ)− wi(t))(λi − di(t)) +
∑
i,j
(dij(t+ δ)− dij(t))(vij − wi(t+ δ)).
Again since w(t) is continuous, we have limδ→0 vij −wi(t+ δ) = vij −wi(t). Since the patients only
choose hospitals that maximize their utilities, for any i, j such that vij − wi(t) < uj(t), we have
vij −wi(t+ δ) < uj(t) for arbitrarily small δ, and thus dij(t) = dij(t+ δ) = 0. That is, for each Pj ,∑
i:vij−wi(t)=uj (t)
dij(t) =
∑
i:vij−wi(t)=uj(t)
dij(t+ δ) = 1.
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Combining this equation with Equation (7) we have
lim
δ→0
P (t+ δ)− P (t)
δ
= −
∑
i:wi(t)>0 or di(t)≥λi
(di(t)− λi)
2
λi
+
∑
j
uj(t) lim
δ→0
∑
i:vij−wi(t)=uj (t)
(dij(t+ δ)− dij(t))
δ
= −
∑
i:wi(t)>0 or di(t)≥λi
(di(t)− λi)
2
λi
+
∑
j
uj(t) lim
δ→0
1− 1
δ
= −
∑
i:wi(t)>0 or di(t)≥λi
(di(t)− λi)
2
λi
. (10)
To upper-bound the last part of Equation (10), consider the set of hospitals
B , {i : w¯i − wi(t) = max
i′∈[k]
w¯i′ − wi′(t)}.
As w(t) < w¯ before the dynamics converges, there exists i such that w¯i − wi(t) > 0. Thus for any
i with w¯i = 0, i /∈ B. By Theorem 3,
|h¯−1(i)| = λi ∀i ∈ B.
For any patient j with h¯(j) ∈ B, we have
∑
i∈B dij(t) = 1, because when the waiting times change
from w¯ to w(t) the utilities of j at hospitals in B become strictly more advantageous against his
utilities at hospitals not in B. Thus∑
j:h¯(j)∈B
∑
i∈B
dij(t) =
∑
j:h¯(j)∈B
1 =
∑
i∈B
|h¯−1(i)| =
∑
i∈B
λi.
Let BP be the set of patients j such that h¯(j) /∈ B and j is adjacent to a hospital in B in the
demand graph of w¯ (BP for “boundary patients”). Notice that BP 6= ∅ as B 6= [k]. For any
j ∈ BP , we again have
∑
i∈B dij(t) = 1, for a similar reason as before —that is, at w¯ patient j is
indifferent between the best hospital for him in B and the best for him not in B, and from w¯ to
w(t) the hospitals in B become strictly more advantageous. Accordingly,∑
i∈B
di(t) ≥
∑
j:h¯(j)∈B
∑
i∈B
dij(t) +
∑
j∈BP
∑
i∈B
dij(t) =
∑
i∈B
λi +
∑
j∈BP
1 ≥
∑
i∈B
λi + 1.
Let B′ , {i ∈ B|di(t) ≥ λi}. Note that
∑
i∈B\B′ λi ≥
∑
i∈B\B′ di(t), and therefore∑
i∈B′
di(t) ≥
∑
i∈B′
λi + 1.
Thus we have by the concavity of the x2 function and Jensen’s inequality:
lim
δ→0
P (t+ δ) − P (t)
δ
= −
∑
i:wi(t)>0 or di(t)≥λi
(di(t)− λi)
2
λi
≤ −
∑
i∈B′
(di(t)− λi)
2
λmax
= −
|B′|
λmax
·
1
|B′|
·
∑
i∈B′
(di(t)−λi)
2 ≤ −
|B′|
λmax
·
(∑
i∈B′(di(t)− λi)
|B′|
)2
≤ −
|B′|
λmax
·
(
1
|B′|
)2
≤ −
1
kλmax
,
(11)
22
for any time t before the dynamics converges.
Letting T = 2kλmaxMSW and assuming that the dynamics does not converge before time T ,
we now show that P (T ) = 0 and thus the dynamics must converge at time T . For any t < T , by
Inequality (11) and our hypothesis, there exists δ(t) such that for all δ ∈ (0, δ(t)), P (t+ δ)−P (t) ≤
−δ/(2kλmax). Assume P (T ) > 0, and let
t∗ , sup{t : t ≤ T, P (t)− P (0) ≤ −t/(2kλmax)}.
As P (t) is continuous, we have P (t∗) − P (0) ≤ −t∗/(2kλmax). Thus t
∗ < T , as P (T ) − P (0) >
0−MSW = −T/(2kλmax). Accordingly, there exists δ ∈ (0, T − t
∗) such that P (t∗ + δ)−P (t∗) ≤
−δ/(2kλmax). Letting t
′ = t∗ + δ, we have t∗ < t′ ≤ T and
P (t′)− P (0) = P (t∗ + δ)− P (t∗) + P (t∗)− P (0) ≤ −(t∗ + δ)/(2kλmax) = −t
′/(2kλmax),
contradicting the definition of t∗.
Therefore P (T ) = 0, and the dynamics converges to w¯ in time at most T , as desired.
Remark 4. Although the potential function used in the above proof is similar to that used in the
Hungarian method for unit-demand auctions, the analysis is different. For example, the potential
function in the latter measure the total price paid at each time step, while ours measures the
“budgeted” total waiting time
∑
i λiwi(t), which can be very different from the total waiting time.
Moreover, in the latter the prices of the goods for sale never go down, making the analysis much
easier. While in our dynamics the waiting times may go up and down, depending on the demands.
6 The Optimality of the Randomized Assignment
Although waiting time is widely used to ration demand in economic settings, it may burn a lot
of social welfare, since the time waited is not beneficial to anybody. Therefore in this section, we
study different allocation schemes in healthcare and give evidence that the government can avoid
the welfare-burning effect of waiting times by limiting the choices available to the patients. In
particular, we show that the randomized assignment is actually optimal in terms of social welfare
in many cases.
Following our discussion in Section 1, we consider the case of two hospitals, a “good” one H1
and a “bad” one H0, with costs c1 > c0. As already said, whoever prefers H0 can be directly
assigned there and we do not consider them in our setting any more. The patients preferring H1
are indexed by the interval [0, 1], and each patient x is associated with a value v(x), indicating how
long he is willing to wait at H1 to be treated there instead of H0. We assume that the patients
have been renamed and normalized, so that v(x) is non-decreasing and v(0) = 0. Since the number
of patients is infinite, we talk about the cost density ci(x) of each hospital, rather than the cost for
serving a single patient. Without loss of generality, c1(x) ≡ 1 and c0(x) ≡ 0. The government has
budget B ∈ (0, 1), meaning that at most a B fraction of the patients can be served at H1. The
government’s goal is to maximize the expected social welfare subject to the requirement that the
budget constraint is satisfied in expectation.
In the randomized assignment, the government assigns each patient to H1 with probability p
and waiting time 0. The budget constraint gives∫ 1
0
pc1(x)dx = p = B,
and the corresponding social welfare, denoted by SWr, is
SWr =
∫ 1
0
pv(x)dx = B
∫ 1
0
v(x)dx. (12)
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Below we compare this social welfare with that of lotteries.
Definition 7. A contract is a pair (p,w), where p ∈ [0, 1] is the probability of assigning a patient
to H1, and w ≥ 0 is the waiting time for that patient at H1.
A lottery consists of a set of contracts, denoted by the domain D ⊆ [0, 1] of the probabilities,
and the waiting time function w(p) defined over D.
Given a contract C = (p,w) for patient x, the expected utility of x is
u(x,C) = p · (v(x) − w).
Given a lottery L = (D,w(p)), each patient x chooses the contract C(x) = (p(x), w(p(x))) maxi-
mizing his expected utility. Namely, for each p ∈ D,
u(x,C(x)) ≥ u(x, (p,w(p))).
If there are more than one values of p that maximize the expected utility of x, we assume that p(x)
is the smallest one, so that the cost of serving patient x is minimized. Notice that p(x) depends on
x only indirectly, via the function v(x): indeed, p(x) = p(x′) whenever v(x) = v(x′). Thus we can
write p(x) as p(v(x)).
As an example, the randomized assignment is a lottery with D = {B} and w(B) = 0.16 As
another example, any equilibrium assignment is also a lottery, with D = [0, 1] and w(p) always
equal to the waiting time of H1 specified by the equilibrium. Indeed, for every patient x, the
contract maximizing his expected utility is to go to the hospital assigned by the equilibrium with
probability 1.
Without loss of generality, we assume that D is a subinterval of [0, 1], denoted by [a, b]. Indeed,
if a patient can choose between (p1, w(p1)) and (p2, w(p2)) according to the lottery, then by using
a “mixed strategy” he can choose to be assigned to H1 with any probability p = αp1 + (1 − α)p2
with α ∈ [0, 1], and corresponding expected waiting time αp1w(p1) + (1− α)p2w(p2).
Also without loss of generality, we assume that the patients’ expected waiting time function
p · w(p) is convex, and thus differentiable almost everywhere. Indeed, for any contracts C1 =
(p1, w(p1)), C2 = (p2, w(p2)), and C = (p,w(p)) with p = αp1 + (1 − α)p2 for some α ∈ [0, 1], if
p ·w(p) > αp1w(p1)+ (1−α)p2w(p2), then a patient is always better off by mixing between C1 and
C2 instead of choosing C. Thus we may simply assume that p ·w(p) ≤ αp1w(p1)+(1−α)p2w(p2).
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The social welfare and the budget constraint are naturally defined for lotteries, as follows.
Definition 8. Given a lottery L = ([a, b], w(p)) and the contracts (p(x), w(p(x))) chosen by the
patients x ∈ [0, 1], letting u(x) , u(x, (p(x), w(p(x))), the social welfare of L, denoted by SWL, is
SWL =
∫ 1
0
u(x)dx.
Lottery L is feasible if the budget constraint is satisfied, namely,
∫ 1
0 p(x)dx = B.
Notice that we require a feasible lottery to use up all the budget. This is again without any
loss of generality, since our theorem below implies that any lottery with cost B′ < B is beaten by
the randomized assignment with budget B′, and thus by the one with budget B.
We assume that the expected waiting time function pw(p) is piece-wise twice differentiable in p.
Notice that, although assuming twice differentiability of pw(p) over the whole domain is too much,
16In general D can be a proper subset of [0, 1], as the government may not offer the whole interval [0, 1] for the
patients to choose from.
17Notice that w(p) itself may not be convex.
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assuming it piece-wisely is quite natural. For example, the government may use different w(p)’s
for different intervals of p, but inside each interval it uses a smooth w(p). Both the randomized
assignment and equilibrium assignments trivially satisfy this assumption.
The following theorem shows that, when the distribution of the patients’ valuations accumulates
toward the higher-value side, the randomized assignment is optimal compared with any lottery.
Since equilibrium assignments are special cases of lotteries, the randomized assignment is optimal
compared with them as well.
Theorem 6. For any concave valuation function v(x) and any feasible lottery L = ([a, b], w(p)),
we have SWr ≥ SWL.
Proof. As the choice of p(x) maximizes the utility of x, for any ∆ > 0 patient x prefers contract
C(x) = (p(x), w(p(x))) to contract C(x+∆) = (p(x+∆), w(p(x+∆))), and patient x+∆ prefers
C(x+∆) to C. That is,
u(x) = p(x)[v(x) − w(p(x))] ≥ p(x+∆)[v(x) − w(p(x+∆))],
and
u(x+∆) = p(x+∆)[v(x+∆)− w(p(x+∆))] ≥ p(x)[v(x +∆)− w(p(x))].
Accordingly,
v(x) ·∆p(x) ≤ ∆(p(x) · w(p(x))), and v(x+∆) ·∆p(x) ≥ ∆(p(x) · w(p(x))). (13)
As pw(p) is piece-wise twice differentiable, all the differential equations and statements made
in this paragraph hold piece-wisely, and we shall not mention the piece-wiseness again and again.
To begin with, letting ∆→ 0 in Equation 13, we have (with variable x omitted for conciseness)
v =
d(pw(p))
dp
, (14)
where the function on the right-hand side is well defined and differentiable in p. As p(v) is the
inverse of Equation 14, it is differentiable in v. As v(x) is concave, it is differentiable in x almost
everywhere. Thus p(x) = p(v(x)) is differentiable in x. Accordingly, we have
du(x) = dp · (v − w) + p · (dv − dw) = p · dv + v · dp − (w · dp+ p · dw)
= p · dv + v · dp− d(p · w) = p · dv + v · dp − v · dp = p · dv. (15)
(Notice that p(v) and p(x) may not be continuous functions, but we only need them to be “nice”
piece-wisely.)
Now putting all the pieces together and integrating both sides of Equation 15 over the whole
domain, we have
u(x) =
∫ v(x)
0
p(vˆ)dvˆ. (16)
As v(x) is non-decreasing and concave, we have that v′(x) ≥ 0 and v′(x) is non-increasing.
If there exists x < 1 such that v′(x) = 0, then let x0 be the smallest number with v
′(x0) = 0;
otherwise (i.e., v(x) is strictly increasing) let x0 = 1. We have that v(x) is strictly increasing on
[0, x0] and constant on [x0, 1]. Let v0 = v(x0). Following Equation 16 the social welfare of lottery
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L is
SWL =
∫ 1
0
u(x)dx =
∫ 1
0
∫ v(x)
0
p(vˆ)dvˆdx =
∫ x0
0
∫ v(x)
0
p(vˆ)dvˆdx+
∫ 1
x0
∫ v0
0
p(vˆ)dvˆdx
=
∫ v0
0
(
p(vˆ)
∫ x0
v−1(vˆ)
dx
)
dvˆ +
∫ v0
0
(
p(vˆ)
∫ 1
x0
dx
)
dvˆ
=
∫ v0
0
p(vˆ) · (x0 − v
−1(vˆ))dvˆ +
∫ v0
0
p(vˆ) · (1− x0)dvˆ
=
∫ x0
0
p(x)(x0 − x)v
′(x)dx+
∫ x0
0
p(x)(1 − x0)v
′(x)dx
=
∫ x0
0
p(x)(1 − x)v′(x)dx.
Similarly, the social welfare of the randomized assignment can be written as
SWr =
∫ 1
0
Bv(x)dx =
∫ 1
0
∫ v(x)
0
Bdvdx =
∫ x0
0
∫ v(x)
0
Bdvdx+
∫ 1
x0
∫ v0
0
Bdvdx
=
∫ v0
0
∫ x0
v−1(vˆ)
Bdxdvˆ +
∫ v0
0
∫ 1
x0
Bdxdvˆ =
∫ v0
0
B(x0 − v
−1(vˆ))dvˆ +
∫ v0
0
B(1− x0)dvˆ
=
∫ x0
0
B(x0 − x)v
′(x)dx+
∫ x0
0
B(1− x0)v
′(x)dx =
∫ x0
0
B(1− x)v′(x)dx.
To prove SWr − SWL ≥ 0, below we first show that p(x) is non-decreasing. To do so, again notice
that p(x) maximizes the expected utility of x. Thus for any two patients x1 < x2, we have
u(x1) = p(x1)(v(x1)− w(p(x1))) ≥ p(x2)(v(x1)− w(p(x2)))
and
u(x2) = p(x2)(v(x2)−w(p(x2))) ≥ p(x1)(v(x2)− w(p(x1))).
Thus p(x2)(v(x2) − v(x1)) ≥ p(x1)(v(x2) − v(x1)). If v(x2) = v(x1) then p(x2) = p(x1) (as we
already said, p(x) only depends on v(x)), otherwise p(x2) ≥ p(x1). That is, the function p(x) is
non-decreasing.
As L is feasible, we have
∫ 1
0 p(x)dx = B. Since v(x) is constant on [x0, 1], so is p(x). Therefore
p(x0) ≥ B. Accordingly, there exists xB ∈ [0, x0] such that p(x) ≤ B for all x < xB, and p(x) ≥ B
for all x ≥ xB. Thus we have
SWr − SWL =
∫ x0
0
(B − p(x))(1 − x)v′(x)dx
=
∫ xB
0
(B − p(x))(1 − x)v′(x)dx+
∫ x0
xB
(B − p(x))(1 − x)v′(x)dx.
Notice that the value of p(xB) does not affect the value of the integration, thus without loss of
generality we assume p(xB) = B.
Again because v′(x) is non-negative and non-increasing, for any x ≤ xB , we have (1−x)v
′(x) ≥
(1− xB)v
′(xB) ≥ 0. Because B − p(x) ≥ 0 for all x ≤ xB , we have
(B − p(x))(1 − x)v′(x) ≥ (B − p(x))(1 − xB)v
′(xB).
Similarly, for any x ≥ xB, we have 0 ≤ (1 − x)v
′(x) ≤ (1 − xB)v
′(xB) and B − p(x) ≤ 0, which
again implies
(B − p(x))(1 − x)v′(x) ≥ (B − p(x))(1 − xB)v
′(xB).
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Thus
SWr − SWL ≥
∫ xB
0
(B − p(x))(1 − xB)v
′(xB)dx+
∫ x0
xB
(B − p(x))(1 − xB)v
′(xB)dx
= (1− xB)v
′(xB)
∫ x0
0
(B − p(x))dx.
Following the budget constraint we have∫ 1
0
p(x)dx =
∫ x0
0
p(x)dx+ p(x0)(1 − x0) = B =
∫ x0
0
Bdx+B(1− x0),
and thus ∫ x0
0
(B − p(x))dx = (p(x0)−B)(1− x0).
Therefore
SWr − SWL ≥ (1− xB)v
′(xB)(p(x0)−B)(1− x0) ≥ 0,
where the second inequality is because xB ≤ 1, v
′(xB) ≥ 0, p(x0) ≥ B, and x0 ≤ 1.
In sum, no feasible lottery can generate more social welfare than the randomized assignment,
and Theorem 6 holds.
Remark 5. Notice that the analysis above holds as long as (1 − x)v′(x) is non-increasing. Thus
the randomized assignment is optimal compared with any lottery even for some convex valuation
function, such as v(x) = ex. It would be interesting to fully characterize the condition under which
the randomized assignment is optimal.
It is interesting to look at the above result from a different point of view. Since each patient’s
valuation is described by a single number, we are considering a single-parameter setting. With
discrete patients, the capacity of the more expensive hospital is exactly λ1 = B/c1, and the game
becomes a unit-demand auction for λ1 copies of identical goods. In the latter setting, the prior-
free money-burning mechanisms studied in [14] try to maximize the same social welfare as in our
model. On the one hand, the solution concept used in [14] is dominant-strategy-truthfulness in
expectation, so the final outcome realized may not be an equilibrium for the buyers. Thus the
optimality of randomized assignment does not apply when compared with their mechanisms. On
the other hand, their mechanisms are benchmarked against a particular class of mechanisms which
do not include randomized assignment. Thus their optimality result does not apply either when
compared with randomized assignment. It would be interesting to study how these two types of
mechanisms compare with each other in different cases.
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